research through client commissions on bond trades, while over 90 percent of money managers acquire equity research through client commissions. This is because most fixed income broker-dealers are actively engaged in positioning bonds.
 Several non-positioning broker-dealers have recently entered the inter-dealer market to perform agency and certain riskless principal trades. Not only do these broker-dealers provide money managers with valuable investment research, but they provide full transparency that allows money managers to be certain of price improvement.
Money managers' use of client commissions on bond trades to pay for fixed income investment research is both legally permissible and in their investors' best interest as long as the trades are executed by a non-positioning broker-dealer on an agency or certain riskless principal basis. Money managers' use of client commissions on equity trades to pay for research has been routine and widespread for decades. Figure 1 illustrates the relations between the parties. In a typical client commission arrangement, the money manager (M) offers the broker (B) a premium commission to execute portfolio trades, with the commissions being paid by client-investors (C) out of portfolio assets (P). Either before or after the 1 A fixed income security is one that pays the holder a contractually fixed stream of payments over a specified term. Examples include mortgages, corporate bonds, and government bonds. Barring default by the issuer, receipt of the promised payments by the holder is riskless, although changes in market interest rates, default risk, and other factors will cause the price at which the security trades in the market to change. Equity securities, in contrast, promise the holder a share of the issuer's profits. Examples include corporate stock and limited partnership interests. It is widely understood that investors should weight their retirement accounts increasingly toward fixed income securities and away from equities as they approach and enter retirement to ensure a steady stream of retirement income.
A. Brief History of the Section 28(e) Safe Harbor B. Bond Trading and Fixed Income Research under Section 28(e) -Early Status
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manager orders the trades, the broker provides the manager with research as a quid pro quo for the agreed commission premium. The manager uses the research to identify mispriced securities and then executes the associated trades through the broker to enhance investor returns. Since the beginning of organized securities trading, it has been common practice for brokers-dealers to provide clients with proprietary in-house research using brokerage commissions as a quid pro quo for their clients' trading business. Owing to the Global Settlement, however, managers now increasingly rely on the use of client commissions to acquire independent third-party research, with their brokers paying a portion of the commission premium to the independent research vendor (V).
Money managers' use of client commissions to pay for investment research ─ commonly termed "soft dollar brokerage" 2 ─ is specifically protected by a statutory safe harbor under Section 28(e) of the Securities Exchange Act (1934) known as the "paying up amendment " of 1975. 3 In the SEC's words, Congress passed the safe harbor "to allow money managers to use client funds to obtain 'brokerage and research services' for their managed accounts under certain circumstances without being presumed to have breached their fiduciary duties to clients or violated federal law." 4 2 In its 1998 Inspection Sweep, the U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission appropriately re-characterized soft dollars as "client commissions." The reason for the change is that term "soft dollars" was traditionally used to describe a broker's provision of third-party research, whereas client commissions is intended to describe the provision of both proprietary and third-party research. Any time a manager receives "brokerage or research services" other than execution from a broker the arrangement raises conflict-ofinterest concerns. In Frequently Asked Questions on Form ADV and IARD, for example, the SEC emphasized that managers receiving proprietary research from full-service brokers should treat this as potential Participation or Interest in Client Transactions on form ADV. See Frequently Asked Questions on Form ADV and IARD, available at, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/iard/iardfaq.shtml#additional (stating in relevant part, "Answer 'Yes' to Item 8.E if you receive any research or other product or service that is not execution from any broker-dealer or third party in connection with client securities transactions. Neither the source of the research (i.e., whether it is produced by a third party or produced on a proprietary basis by the executing broker) nor your affiliation with the research provider should have any effect on your answer to Item 8. which are compensated by a commission, but not to principal trades, which are compensated by a mark-up or mark-down. 6 Accordingly, the SEC interpreted the safe harbor as providing no protection for investment research on trades in OTC equities or bonds, which were traded on a principal basis. In 2001, however, the SEC modified its interpretation of the term commission to include certain riskless principal trades on which the mark-up or mark-down is reported on the confirmation and there is a trade reporting system in place to assure adequate transparency. 6 In an agency trade the broker-dealer promises to use its best effort to execute the trade on its client's behalf and puts none of its own capital at risk. On a buy order the broker searches for the lowest available price, buys the securities for its client's account, and then adds a commission equal to, say, five cents per share times the number of shares purchased. In a principal trade, the dealers puts its own capital at risk, buying the securities for its own account and then reselling them to the client after adding a mark-up, and vice-versa for sell transactions. In some cases, the same trader may act as both a broker and as a pick securities that outperform their specified index after charging brokerage commissions and other transaction costs, the advisory fee, and various administrative expenses to the fund? Are the billions of dollars the industry spends on research to identify mispriced securities a huge waste of investor resources?
Section II addresses this question, showing that value-added from research is perfectly consistent with the notion of market efficiency and that early empirical work to the contrary is both fundamentally flawed and inconsistent with more recent and more thorough empirical findings. In addition, recent work shows that personal pension account managers' investment returns increase with the extent to which they pay up for
research. An increase of 1.0 cent per share in commissions increased the average money manager's investment returns (alpha) by 4.3 basis points per quarter. Although returns on risky equity securities normally exceed those on less risky fixed income securities, fixed income research can nevertheless substantially increase investor returns. With the life expectancy of U.S. retirees bound to increase over time, it is essential that their personal pension accounts earn the maximum possible return consistent with prudent management and existing regulatory constraints.
As various legal, regulatory, and market forces change how investment research is produced and provided, and as baby boomers inevitably shift their portfolios in favor of fixed income securities, money managers and their clients must be made fully aware of the availability, legality, and importance of investment research. Section III begins with a brief history of the safe harbor for client commissions, starting with the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975. 7 It then describes the early regulatory status of bond trades under Section 28(e) and the two types of trades now eligible for safe harbor protection. Section III discusses various forces at work in U.S. financial markets over the past decade that are reshaping the way Americans' retirement savings are being managed. One force is the widespread entry of commercial banks into securities trading via their mergers with large full-line brokeragde houses. These mergers prompted many former registered broker reps of bulge-bracket investment banks to convert to small Registered Investment Advisers (RIA). Another force is the Global Settlement, which has generated a marked shift away from proprietary research and toward independent, third-party research. 7 See Securities Acts Amendments of 1975 , Pub. L. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97, 161-62 (1975 .
In light of these forces, the critical question is how money managers can and should get the research to best serve their retirement account clients. Section IV addresses the important role investment research plays in money managers' fiduciary obligation to their clients. The primary concern clients should have is that their managers will have too little incentive to perform research if they are expected to pay for all research out of their own pockets ─ which is to say out of their management fee. If managers are under-researched, their clients' investment returns will suffer. Rather than reflecting a conflict of interest, Section IV shows that allowing managers to use client commissions to pay for fixed income securities research provides managers with a powerful incentive to aggressively increase their retirement clients' investment returns.
Section V summarizes and provides concluding comments. Given the analysis and empirical findings provided in this essay, Section V discusses the possibility that money managers might be found to have breached their fiduciary duty if they fail to use client commissions to pay up for research. Fama's work suggests that if securities markets are informationally efficient neither investors nor their money managers can expect to make money doing research to identify mispriced securities because prices will adjust instantly to newly discovered information.
In his framework, markets are "weak-form" efficient if a manager's research based on past prices provides no security selection advantage. They are "semi-strong form" efficient if a manager's research based on publicly available information provides no such advantage. And they are "strong-form" efficient if manager's research based on any information, public or private, conveys no advantage.
Fama surveyed the extensive empirical work on securities market efficiency to see if there was evidence available to reject any form of the efficient markets hypothesis.
Foremost in his survey was Michael Jensen's (1968) study of the Net Asset Value (NAV) returns to actively-managed mutual funds from 1945-1964. 9 By their very nature, active managers claim heavy involvement in research to identify mispriced securities, for which they typically charge an asset-based management fee well in excess of those passive index fund managers charge.
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To adjust for differences in market risk across funds, and others:
The variables R j and R m are the observed returns to fund j and to the S&P 500 Market Index after accounting for dividend distributions, and R f is the risk-free rate of return on U.S. government bonds, with each variable being observed over each year in the sample.
The differences R j -R f and R m -R f reflect the returns rational investors must earn to be compensated for investing in risky assets rather than the risk-free asset, the so-called "risk premium." The model recognizes that rational managers will sell (or buy) securities whose expected returns are too low (or high) until prices fall (or rise) to provide them with a normal expected return.
The risk premium on any portfolio is affected by a number of factors, but the factor Jensen thought most important was the risk premium on the market portfolio. As shown in Figure 2 , the regression equation above amounts to fitting a straight line to a scatter diagram of points reflecting various concurrent observations of R j -R f and R m -R f . Alpha is the intercept of the line (that is, the value of R j -R f when R m -R f is zero) and β is its slope. The scatter diagram itself will rarely form a straight line, and u is an error term reflecting the deviations of each observation from the fitted line under the conditions that the fit of the line is constructed to minimize the sum of the squared errors and that the sum of all errors is zero. After netting out brokerage commissions and other transaction costs, advisory fees, and administrative expenses, Jensen found that the average alpha across funds in his sample was a statistically significant negative 1.1 percent per year, indicating that the returns to active management were on average less than the returns on the market portfolio.
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And although he found several funds whose alphas were persistently positive (though only slightly so) he was unable to rule out the possibility that these observations were due entirely to luck. Jensen concluded that active management (research) adds nothing to "alpha," and may even reduce it. In his words:
One must realize that these analysts are extremely well endowed. Moreover, they operate in the securities markets every day and have wide-ranging contacts and associations in both the business and financial communities. Thus, the fact that they are apparently unable to forecast returns accurately enough to recover their research and transaction costs is a striking piece of evidence in favor of the strong form of the [efficient markets] hypothesis.
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The question of how active management can possibly add value in a strong-form efficient market was answered theoretically by Grossman & Stiglitz (1980) . 14 They made the important point that it is impossible for markets to be informationally efficient in the traditional sense. If markets are strong-form efficient, instantly impounding all private information into prices, market participants seeking to discover such information will be unable to cover their research costs and will refuse to engage in price discovery.
And yet, we know that price discovery does not fall from the sky.
The traditional notions of market efficiency ─ weak form, semi-strong form, and strong form ─ are simply empirically testable statements of a more fundamental version of market efficiency. According to this version, any given security can be mispriced at any given moment. It may be beneficial for market participants to do research to discover mispriced securities and to trade those securities to make money, correcting any This finding is consistent with a Grossman-Stiglitz efficient market equilibrium.
Wermers (2000) More recently, Kosowski, Timmerman, Wermers, and White (2006) applied an emergent, statistical method known as a "bootstrap" analysis to the data.
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Among other things, this method allowed them to determine whether managers who generated positive alphas did so through superior skill in picking securities or purely as a result of luck. If superior performance was based on luck, alone, they expected nine funds in their database to generate alphas (net of costs) exceeding ten percent per year for at least a five-year period. Instead they found 29 funds that did so. This provided overwhelming evidence to reject the hypothesis that active managers lack persistent securities picking skill. Consistent with a Berk-Green equilibrium, a sizeable minority of fund managers was able to generate superior portfolio returns, and these managers' performance tended to persist over time.
Although these findings strongly suggest, in general, that investment research can add alpha, they apply solely to the research performed by active mutual fund managers and not to that of private money managers such as retirement account advisers. Nor do PARTS 200, 201, 230, 240, 242, 249, and 270 (2005 (2) A person exercising investment discretion with respect to an account shall make such disclosure of his policies and practices with respect to commissions that will be paid for effecting securities transactions, at such times and in such manner, as the appropriate regulatory agency, by rule, may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
(3) For purposes of this subsection a person provides brokerage and research services insofar as he -(A) furnishes advice, either directly or through publications or writings, as to the value of securities, the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities, and the availability of securities or purchasers or sellers of securities;
(B) furnishes analyses and reports concerning issuers, industries, securities, economic factors and trends, portfolio strategy, and the performance of accounts; or The transition from the system of fixed to unfixed commission rates is expected by some to cause confusion and disruption. Many fear that governing law applicable to fiduciaries will dictate that the money manager must always seek the lowest execution cost for portfolio transactions and that he may not charge a managed account or fund with an execution-plus research rate which may be higher than an execution-only rate. If that interpretation of fiduciary law should prove accurate, the future availability and quality of research and other services in an environment of unfixed rates could be jeopardized, with potentially harmful consequences to all investors.
S. 249 is therefore intended to permit a fiduciary to cause an account to pay a broker or dealer an amount of commission for effecting a securities transaction in excess of the commission another broker-dealer might have charged for effecting that transaction so long as the investment advisor or fiduciary determines in good faith that the commission was reasonable in relation to the value of the brokerage and research services provided by such broker-dealer. This standard of "reasonableness" does not require that the value of research and brokerage services be imputed to any specific account; rather reasonableness is to be measured in view either of that particular transaction or the fiduciary's overall responsibilities with respect to the accounts over which he exercises investment discretion. It is thus unnecessary for the money manager to show that specific services benefited specific accounts.
The Committee intends Section 28(e) to be exclusive and plenary unless otherwise expressly provided by contract and to supersede state common law and any other state or federal law in existence prior to the enactment of the amendment insofar as such law might apply to such conduct. . . .
The definition of brokerage and research services is intended to comprehend the subject matter in the broadest terms, subject always to the good faith standard in Subsection (e) (1). . . .
[T]he touchstone for determining when a service is within or without the definition in Section 28(e) (3) is whether it provides lawful and appropriate assistance to the money manager in the carrying out of his responsibilities.
Several of these points deserve emphasis. First, one function of the safe harbor is to allow small advisory firms to compete with their larger and more established rivals.
Second, market-driven management fees are insufficient to fund investment research, and research, therefore, is not an expense of management to be covered by the management fee. For decades, if not longer, money managers had been using client commissions to acquire research, and therefore were not expected to pay for research out of management fees. Third, all investors are harmed if the threat of fiduciary suits leads money managers to be under-researched. Finally, the scope of 28(e) is to be interpreted permissively subject to the good faith standard.
The exact scope of Section 28(e)'s protection of "brokerage and research services" has evolved over the years with a number of SEC no-action letters, cases, and administrative proceedings. Early on, the SEC interpreted the term "brokerage and research services" in a way that confined its application to proprietary research products.
But in response to the "changing array of research products and the impact of new technology on brokerage practices," and believing "that the issue is ultimately one of good faith on the part of the money manager" best addressed through disclosure, 27 in 1986 the SEC relaxed its interpretation of brokerage and research services to include
anything that "provides lawful and appropriate assistance to the money manager in the performance of his investment decision-making responsibilities."
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The 1986 Release explicitly allowed generic research inputs to be included in the safe harbor and was followed by considerable expansion in independent research, largely at the expense of established full-service brokerage houses.
B. Bond Trading and Fixed Income Research under Section 28(e) -Early Status
There is no indication either Congress or the SEC ever intended to exclude bond trades or fixed income research from the safe harbor provisions of Section 28(e). The Before taking enforcement action in several pending cases under ERISA, which regulates the management of private pension funds, the DOL requested the SEC's opinion on whether the safe harbor applies to trades in fixed income securities and over-the-counter (OTC) stocks. This included trades listed on the National Association of Securities Dealers Automatic Quotation System (NASDAQ), which at the time were traded primarily by dealers on a principal basis rather than by brokers on an agency basis. In contrast to the commissions, which brokers receive for acting as agents, when trading for their own account as dealers they earn a mark up or mark down equal to the difference between the price at which they buy and the price at which they sell. In many cases they sell out of their inventory or buy to add to their inventory, which is to say they "engage in In their broker-dealer divisions, these banks employ individual brokers to manage retail investor accounts and institutional brokers to trade equities on behalf of institutional clients in an agency capacity. These banks also have trading desks that buy and sell equity securities and bonds for their own and the house's account. Bank acquisition of many broker-dealers resulted in the loss of a large number of bond trading desks. And few of the large broker-dealers have ever traded bonds strictly in an agency capacity. In addition, banks have the borrowing capability to buy and hold bonds that provide an attractive coupon rate relative to the bank's cost of capital and earn a riskless income stream on the "carry." When a money manager asks the banks' trading desk to execute a bond trade, the bank broker has the discretion to fill the order out of inventory or to enter the dealer market, take a position, and then offset that position to fill the manager's order.
The bank can then charge a mark-up or mark-down for the service. The chance to earn a carry on advantageously priced bonds creates a conflict of interest for the bank. When a client seeks to buy bonds the positioning bank-dealer happens to hold in inventory (because they promise an attractive carry), the dealer will be tempted to enter the dealers market to fill the order at a less advantageous price rather than releasing the bonds from inventory. The converse is also true. The result is that small and mid-size money managers have seen an increase in transaction cost and a reduction in liquidity in the positioning bank-dealer bond market. As these managers' baby boom clients retire, their employer sponsored 401(k)s will have to be rolled over to personal pension accounts.
Efficient Bond Market Execution
Inter-dealer brokers have become efficient executers of bond trades because of their access to the "broker's" market, also known as the "inside market," illustrated in 
E. The Global Settlement and the Move from Proprietary to Third-Party Research
In April 2003, then New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer concluded his investigation into deceptive analyst reports at the ten largest Wall Street brokerage firms.
Spitzer used the Martin Act to compel disclosure from these firms. Merrill Lynch was the first firm to honor the request, and quickly gave up the names of other firms engaging in deceptive practices. Analysts at these firms had been publicly recommending stocks during the dotcom boom of the late 1990's. At the same time, these analysts were privately ridiculing the same stocks as bad opportunities. Spitzer uncovered a pattern that suggested that these large firms were promoting certain stocks in an attempt to win the same companies' investment banking business.
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The scandal unraveled into the widelypublicized Global Settlement, which condemned these Wall Street firms for allowing their analysts to engage in conflicts of interest that subjected them to investment bank influence. Piper Jaffray Inc., paid fines and penalties of $1.4 billion. Of this amount, $432.5 million was earmarked to fund independent, third-party research. The settlement also required each firm to contract with independent research providers and to make "objective" research available to their customers for a period of five-years.
More importantly, to ensure that analysts' recommendations remain untainted by efforts to obtain investment banking fees, the Global Settlement mandated that analysts' compensation could not be based directly or indirectly on investment banking revenues, and that investment banks must not participate in the analysts' job performance 2008) . 47 The touted explanation for investor confusion is so-called asymmetric information. Investors, the Study concludes, lack the information necessary to assess the incentives of those to whom they entrust their wealth. An alternative explanation for apparent investor confusion between brokers and advisors is that at least some investors are well aware of the differences but that the differences are so inconsequential at the margin that it does not pay the average investor to gather the information to be informed.
interest that encourages them to "churn" their clients' accounts to generate commissions.
The looming regulatory issue is whether brokers should be subject to fiduciary duties that would greatly temper this tendency.
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Industry reports express concern that brokers will "find themselves embroiled in far-flung lawsuits and arbitration hearings that no one in their right mind could envision, all under the banner of 'breach of fiduciary duty'."
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Regulation to this effect appears imminent and will no doubt hasten brokers' departure from bulge-bracket brokerage houses in favor of registering as independent investment advisers, which are compensated by asset-based fees.
As stated previously, approximately 90 percent of third-party equity research is paid for through client commissions. However in the fixed income market there is a misunderstanding. While remuneration on principal trades in fixed income securities is not allowed to pay for research under the safe harbor, a money manager can execute bond trades with a non-positioning broker-dealer on an agency or "certain riskless principal"
basis. In either case, the commission or mark-up qualifies for the safe harbor. In reality, the reason broker-dealers prefer principal transactions more in fixed income securities than in equities is because most fixed income bonds have a coupon that normally earns a positive return for that positioning firm. To this day, a large number of money managers do not realize that paying for third-party research using fixed income trades is permissible because most fixed income broker-dealers engage in positioning and their trades are therefore ineligible for safe harbor protection. 
F. The Current State of 28(e) under the SEC's 2006 Guidance
In May 2004, the SEC requested the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) to form a task force to report and provide recommendations on how to "improve the transparency of mutual fund portfolio transaction costs and distribution arrangements."
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The NASD Task Force's report appeared in November 2004.
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Chaired by Robert R. Glauber and co-chaired by Mary Schapiro (current SEC Chairman),
the Report concluded that "the safe harbor set forth in Section 28(e) of the Exchange Act should be preserved" and that investors will be best served if research of all types, including both proprietary and third-party research, continues to be widely available to all investment managers. . . . [and] that soft dollar practices may be especially beneficial to the clients of smaller investment advisers. These smaller advisers can afford neither a large internal research staff nor extensive hard dollar payments for research. They can, however, supplement their internal research efforts through the use of soft dollar arrangements.
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For an increasing proportion of money managers, safe harbor protection appears essential to ensure they are not under-researched.
In 2006, the SEC issued its long-awaited release Commission Guidance
Regarding Client Commission Practices Under Section 28(e) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.
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The 1. The safe harbor protects fixed income trades executed on an agency basis, as well as "certain riskless principal" trades as defined in the 2001 Guidance.
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2. To take advantage of the safe harbor, a money manager must be able to make a good faith determination that the amount of the commissions, mark-ups or fees is reasonable in relation to the value of the brokerage and research services provided by the broker-dealer.
3. Even though proprietary research has always been implicitly bundled into client commissions rather than paid out of management fees, "the safe harbor encompasses third-party research and proprietary research on equal terms." The language from Section 28(e) referring to eligible research as "advice, analysis and reports" therefore includes a broad array of research products and services consisting of, among other things, seminars, webinars, conferences, and specialty research beneficial to particular managed accounts that are not regularly available to the general public and are directly three-pronged test to be eligible to pay for the research without financial obligation.
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The requirements of this test are as follows:
i. the broker-dealer pays the research preparer directly;
ii. the broker-dealer reviews the description of the services to be paid for with client commissions under the safe harbor for red flags that indicate the services are not within Section 28(e), and agrees with the money manager to use client commissions only to pay for those items that reasonably fall within the safe harbor;
iii. the broker-dealer develops and maintains procedures so that the research payments are documented and paid for promptly.
IV. The Incentive Effects of Using Client Commissions to Pay for Research: Conflict or Cooperation?
This essay has already established that research adds alpha, as proxied by "active" management in the context of publicly-held equity mutual funds, and as proxied by premium commissions per managed dollar in the context of privately-managed retirement and other accounts. Money managers are increasingly shifting toward independent thirdparty research. The financial services industry is experiencing an influx of independent research firms, start-up investment advisers, rollovers from 401(k) accounts to personal pension accounts owing to baby boomer demographics, and a steady weighting towards fixed income securities. Finally, repeated SEC rulings indicate that using client commissions on fixed income agency and certain riskless principal trades to pay for research is covered by the safe harbor. This section shows that money managers' access to client commissions properly motivates them to perform the research necessary to maximize the returns their retirement account clients earn. It provides further empirical evidence in support of this proposition.
Because money managers receive only a small fraction of the alpha they generate, they do not capture the full benefits of their costly research efforts.
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If called on to pay for all research out of their management fee, money managers will be tempted to do too little research. So-called "closet indexing," in which the manager charges a high fee for active (well researched) management but quietly follows a low-cost indexing strategy, is a notorious case in point. When a manager is paid a recurring asset-based fee of, say, 25 basis points, he or she receives only a small fraction of any gains generated through investment performance It is quite natural that in this arrangement, and in other clientfiduciary settings, the client should want to subsidize a fiduciary's use of research.
Indeed, both the law of agency and the law of trusts allow the agent/trustee to deduct legitimate business expenses from the managed account without immediate client 56 An asset-based fee consists of a recurring percentage of the value of the client's account, often around 30 basis points. An "incentive" fee might consist of an asset-based fee plus or minus a larger share of alpha relative to a stated benchmark, with the money manager bearing a share of both positive and negative alpha within prescribed limits. Hartmann (1986) reflect a commonly held sentiment when describing the conflicts which arise from using client commission in cost benefit terms. In their words:
In an environment without Section 28(e), research would be purchased until the last hard dollar spent for the research equalled [sic] the value of that research to the clients. Any additional research would benefit the clients less than its cost, and thus would be an unreasonable expenditure. Thus, if one argues that managers are more willing to buy additional research with soft dollars than they would using hard dollars, then one admits that the purchases are unreasonable in relation to their cost.
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57 Comment (b) to Section 244 further illustrates this point. It states that "[i]f the trustee properly incurs a liability in the administration of the trust, he is entitled to indemnity out of the trust estate either by way of exoneration, that is by using trust property in discharging the liability so that he will not be compelled to use his individual property in discharging it, or by way of reimbursement, that is if he has used his individual property in discharging the liability, by repaying himself out of trust property. 1934 : A 1985 Perspective, 24 Am. Bus. L.J. 139, 176 (1986 .
The sentiment conveyed by these and other commentators is no doubt the source of the SEC's continuing concern over the conflicts of interest thought to plague soft dollar brokerage.
60
Owing to their apparent ignorance of the simple economics of clientfiduciary relations, however, these commentators have made an entirely backward statement about the incentive effects of using client commissions to acquire research.
The Simple Economics of Client-Fiduciary Relations
A substantial body of scholarly literature in economics and finance addresses what is generically known as the "agency problem." In law, an agency relationship exists any time someone, a principal, authorizes another person, the agent, to transact business on his or her behalf. Examples of agents include attorneys, realtors, accountants, money managers, and securities brokers. According to this literature, agents may not always act strictly in the interest of the principals, which lead to costly actions by both parties to reduce the associated inefficiencies. "Agency costs" consist of "monitoring costs"
incurred by the principal, "bonding costs" incurred by the agent, and "residual losses."
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The law of agency and the law of trusts both prescribe default rules that determine the relationship between principals and their agents in the absence of specific agreements to the contrary. In many cases, the law imposes on an agent a fiduciary duty to the principal ─ that is, the duty of utmost good faith and fair dealing. The prospect of legal enforcement ex post reduces agency costs ex ante. 60 It is commonplace to hear soft dollar critics proclaim that all conflicts of interest must be "eliminated." This is an unworkable goal because conflicts, both specific and general, arise whenever a principal acts through a specialized agent, whom all parties recognize is self interested. Under agency law, a conflict of interest exists when the agent's interests are adverse to the principal, but a breach of loyalty occurs only if the agent takes action adverse to the principal without the principal's knowledge. The American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law, Second, Agency (1958) § § 23, 389. It is a breach of loyalty that gives rise to a legal claim against an agent, not the mere fact of a conflict of interest. Agents should, of course, make all reasonable efforts to inform their principals of the presence of specific conflicts of interest 61 Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976 Self-Policing, 25 ECON. INQ. 103 (1987) . This is the legal setting in which investors, such as pension clients, contract with money managers for portfolio management. According to both the common law and statutory law, money managers owe their clients a fiduciary duty. In the context of money management, the client can limit the divergence of a manager's actions by establishing appropriate incentives, such as sharing profits or other benefits and providing the fiduciary with various inputs complementary to the production process. The client can also monitor the manager's compliance through performance standards, with the threat of termination, if the fiduciaries' actions prove sub-optimal. In some situations the client will pay the manager to spend resources bonding the manager against actions that would reduce the benefits of the relationship to the client. In many fiduciary relationships, the parties incur both monitoring and bonding costs. In addition, it is inevitable that some potentially beneficial exchange fails to occur that would have occurred absent agency costs. These are the residual losses. As long as residual losses persist, the parties have an interest in innovating new types of business arrangements to reduce them, that is, to increase the gains from trade.
The extensive literature on the economics of agency relations uniformly recognizes that fiduciaries, such as money managers, whose compensation is based on a fractional share of benefits to their clients, have too little incentive to produce gains for their clients if they are required to pay the entire expense of generating those benefits out of their own account. It is therefore in the client's interest to subsidize inputs that complement the manager's labor effort. The standard market-driven arrangement between money managers and their clients is to use client commissions to acquire research. The obvious alternative to using client commissions to pay for research would be to increase managers' compensation by the expected cost of such inputs and to require them to bear the research expenses directly. But unless the client (or clients) can effectively monitor their managers' to ensure managers are fully researched this would very likely lead managers to be inefficiently frugal. Following this logic, the primary concern money management clients should have is not that managers will over-use brokerage and research services but that they will under-use them if required to pay the entire expense out of their management fee.
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Contrary to conventional wisdom, the critical conflict of interest is that money managers will spend too little on research, devote too little labor effort to identifying mispriced securities, and execute too few profitable trades.
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The efficiency of using client commissions to pay for research reduces the manager's tendency to shirk, as illustrated in Figure 4 . MC shows the marginal cost of active management inputs, consisting of the optimal combination of raw research inputs, manager labor effort to identify mispriced securities, and broker executions. As the manager increases management inputs, marginal cost rises while the increment to portfolio wealth declines, shown by ΔNAV. As a conflict-free benchmark, if the manager owns the entire portfolio and pays all the costs of generating profitable trades he continues providing management up to M * , where MC = ΔNAV, and total portfolio wealth is maximized. But because he receives only a small fractional share, θ, of ΔNAV he instead provides management inputs only up to M°, where MC equals θΔNAV.
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This outcome fails to maximize the parties' joint wealth because an additional dollar spent on research generates more than a dollar in ΔNAV. Presumably the cost to clients from monitoring the manager to ensure he completely refrains from shirking are prohibitive. Burgunder & Hartmann are correct when they assert that using client commissions to acquire research leads managers to do more research than they would otherwise do. By failing to account for the manager's tendency to do too little research, however, the conclusion they draw ─ that managers will therefore use too much research ─ is simply wrong. No one familiar with the simple economics of agency relations could draw this conclusion.
By agreeing to pay brokerage commissions covering pure execution costs, the client causes the manager's cost of inputs to fall, say, to MC-E, in which case he increases management to M † . By also allowing the manager to use brokerage 62 Even an individual principal will decline to spend a dollar monitoring his agent if the benefits from improved agent decision making are less than a dollar, but the situation becomes especially acute where the principal consists of a securities portfolio whose investors are numerous and dispersed. 63 They may also engage in sub-optimal monitoring of execution quality, but the use of a quality-assuring performance bond reduces this problem. 64 It is important to note that managers' share of the portfolio residual is substantially larger than their oneperiod management because they receive a recurring fee. Any permanent increase in portfolio wealth provides them with an increase in compensation equal to the present value of the increase in future fees.
commissions to acquire research, the client further reduces the manager's costs, say to MC-E-R. This encourages him to increase management inputs, perhaps all the way to M * . With increased management, including research, the manager is likely to identify more profitable trading opportunities and to have good reason to order more portfolio trades. 65 Managers earn no expected surplus as a result of the research subsidy because competition bids down fees to a level that exactly covers their expected opportunity costs.
The important point regarding incentive alignment is that, at the margin, using client funds to pay for research adjusts the terms of exchange to encourage managers to do more research and more trading, which benefits portfolio investors. 66 According to the simple economics of agency relations, research can be expected to add alpha.
B. Empirical Tests
The work by Horan & Johnsen (2008) to perform empirical tests.
Theoretical Implications
One way to distinguish between the incentive alignment hypothesis and the unjust enrichment hypothesis is to examine the effect of paying up for research on management fees. Under the unjust enrichment hypothesis, using client commissions to acquire research constitutes a "second best" form of manager compensation. In a competitive managerial labor market at least a portion of the associated wealth transfer should be reflected in a lower management fee. Alternatively, if using client commissions to pay for research improves managers' and brokers' incentives when other mechanisms fail, management fees should be either unrelated or positively related to using client commissions to pay for research under the plausible assumption that managers collectively share in the gains from an efficient economic organization.
The most obvious way to distinguish between the two hypotheses is to examine the effect of paying up for research on risk-adjusted returns. The incentive alignment hypothesis predicts that using client commissions to acquire research leads to higher riskadjusted returns as a result of the manager's increased use of research, labor effort, and brokerage executions. The unjust enrichment hypothesis predicts that using client commissions to pay for research will result in lower risk-adjusted returns because the cost of the premium commissions from misappropriating client assets exceeds the value to the portfolio of improved research and execution and any reduction in the management fee.
Empirical Effects
Horan & Johnsen (2006) calculate each portfolio manager's risk adjusted returns (alpha) using various models, including Jensen's one-factor model. The results are unchanged across the various specifications. Performing a number of robustness checks, and using multivariate regression analysis to adjust for the effects of total portfolio assets, number of accounts, tax-exempt assets, indexing, and trade difficulty as reflected in various style categories, they find that PCMD ─ their proxy for the use of client commissions to pay for research ─ is positively associated with risk-adjusted returns at the 99% confidence level. Since risk-adjusted returns are net of commissions (and other transaction costs), using client commissions clearly appears to provide a net benefit to those clients. As seen in Table 1, 
USING BOND TRADES TO PAY FOR THIRD-PARTY RESEARCH V. Summary and Concluding Remarks
This essay has made several novel and important points regarding money managers' use of client commissions to obtain fixed income research. First, the prevailing evidence shows that research adds alpha, both in the context of public mutual fund management and in the context of private institutional money management. Second, allowing money managers to acquire research using client commissions efficiently incentivizes the managers to be fully researched. Third, top analysts have departed bulge-bracket banks to set up private research shops providing independent third-party research, while many established brokers are departing to set up their own RIA firms, undoubtedly bringing much of their established client base with them. Fourth, as baby boomers near retirement, they will increasingly weight their portfolios toward fixed income securities and away from equities. Their actual retirement will bring a wave of rollovers from 401(k) plans to personal pension accounts. Much of this money will likely find its way into the hands of startup RIA's who lack established research departments.
Fifth, the SEC has affirmatively stated that money managers' receipt of research using agency and certain riskless principal trades is protected by Section 28(e)'s safe harbor.
Safe harbor protection on bond trades is clearly eligible when using a non-positioning, fixed-income broker acting as an agent on behalf of the money manager's clients.
Finally, client commission arrangements on fixed income trades will allow money managers to obtain the research necessary to fulfill fiduciary obligations to their clientinvestors by increasing alpha while maintaining suitably low portfolio risk for retired investors.
Money managers have a fiduciary duty to be fully researched, as reflected by M* units of management in Figure 4 . Given the research subsidy inherent in using client commissions to acquire research, the possibility remains that managers use too much research, perhaps going beyond M * . If the manager receives third-party research in the form of generic inputs, he or she has little to gain from overuse, however, because generic research has no intrinsic value unless the manager provides his own labor effort to transform it into conclusions regarding profitable trading opportunities. From this perspective, it may be that managers overuse proprietary research. With proprietary research the broker provides the labor effort to identify mispriced securities, thereby allowing the manager to conserve his or her own labor effort. This suggests yet another possible conflict of interest.
Several commentators have suggested that a manager's failure to be fully researched might subject him or her to civil suits for a breach of fiduciary duty under certain circumstances. Recent developments in Delaware State corporation law suggest, for example, that its courts are increasingly willing to impose liability on corporate fiduciaries for omissions, that is, for failure to act in the face of an affirmative duty to do so. 68 As Lemke & Lins describe in the context of money management, Some in the industry have raised the possibility that it could be a breach of fiduciary duty for a money manager not to take advantage of the wide variety of brokerage or research services made available with [client commissions]. . . . '[And] some money managers have expressed concern about being sued for paying up for research . . . . It appears they should be more concerned about being sued for acting imprudently if they deliberately cut themselves off from street research or refuse to pay up for other needed brokerage services to the detriment of the accounts they manage. Specifically, MKT, SMB, and HML capture the market effect, firm size effect, and book-to-market effect in security returns, respectively. Portfolio returns are taken from data provided by Mobius Group, Inc. and cover the 1979 through 1997 first quarter period. To be included in the analysis, a portfolio must have at least 12 quarterly returns in the database. The product of Soft Dollar Commission and Annual Turnover is Premium Commissions per Managed Dollar. Ln (Assets) is the natural log of portfolio assets. Ln (Accounts) is the natural log of the number of accounts managed. The Index variable and other strategy class variables are measured on a discrete scale of 0 to 3. Three is descriptive of the fund's strategy, while zero is not descriptive. Percent tax-exempt assets is the proportion of the portfolio composed of pension assets. To avoid colinearity, the Premium Commissions per Managed Dollar Residual term is the OLS residual from having Premium Commissions per Managed Dollar as the dependent variable and all other factors as independent variables. The residual term represents the portion of soft dollar brokerage left unexplained by the remaining independent variables. *Significant at the 10% level. **Significant at the 5% level. ***Significant at the 1% level.
